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ABSTRACT
The number of computational trust models has been in-
creasing rapidly in recent years, yet their applications for
automating trust evaluation are still limited. The main ob-
stacle is the diculty of selecting a suitable trust model
and adapting it for particular trust modeling requirements,
which vary greatly due to the subjectivity of human trust.
The Personalized Trust Framework (PTF) presented in this
paper aims to address this problem by providing a mecha-
nism for human users to capture their trust evaluation pro-
cess in order for it to be replicated by computers. In more
details, a user can specify how he selects a trust model based
on information about the subject whose trustworthiness he
needs to evaluate and how that trust model is congured.
This trust evaluation process is then automated by the PTF
making use of the trust models exibly plugged into the PTF
by the user. By so doing, the PTF enable users reuse and
personalize existing trust models to suit their requirements
without having to reprogram those models.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4.2 [Information Systems Applications]: Types of
Systems|decision support; D.2.11 [Software Engineer-
ing]: Software Architectures|domain-specic architectures;
I.2.m [Articial Intelligence]: Miscellaneous|trust, rep-
utation
Keywords
trust, reputation, extensibility, personalization, framework
1. INTRODUCTION
Trust research in computer science has recently generated
numerous computational trust models (see [11] and [8] for
examples). The main goal of these models is typically to
capture the trust dynamics in human societies and replicate
it (along with its benets) in computer environments. In
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other words, they aim to automate the human trust evalu-
ation process by delegating this task to computers. Despite
the abundance of available trust models, their success has
been limited. The main reason is that existing trust mod-
els typically make assumptions about the availability of the
input information they require and, as a result, do not gen-
eralize well to a dierent application domain than those they
were designed for. As a result, although some might work
well within their target domains, none of them is ready for
generic applications. Such limitation is understandable (and
expected). Trust models are domain dependent because
they rely on information about the trust subjects|the enti-
ties whose trustworthiness is being evaluated|which varies
with dierent types of subject and is typically unique in a
particular application domain. For instance, evaluating the
trustworthiness of a sensor requires the examination of a
(signicantly) dierent set of information than that when
evaluating the trustworthiness of an online news agency. In
addition, trust, by nature, is subjective [4], and even for
the same application, each person has their own view about
how trust should be modeled in that application's domain.
Hence, mainstream users have yet to adopt existing trust
models (with the exception of very simplistic models like
eBay's [12]) since they cannot adapt a computational trust
model to suciently match their mental ones (i.e. change
its behavior) without resorting to re-programming it. This
is cumbersome and requires the end users to understand the
internal working of particular trust models. In addition, dif-
ferent trust models use dierent trust representations that
are an inherent part of their mathematical underpinnings.
Some examples are: trust labels (e.g. very trustworthy,
trustworthy, untrustworthy, very untrustworthy [1]), scalar
numbers (e.g. a real number in [ 1;1] [7]), probability den-
sity function [14], etc. An end user might not be familiar
with any of these variants except the one that his organi-
zation has already been using. Therefore, results produced
by trust models, where possible, should be converted into a
customized representation that can be accepted and shared
by end users from a particular organization.
Against this background, in this paper, we presents a
novel framework called the Personalized Trust Framework
(PTF) that facilitates the utilization of existing trust mod-
els by allowing dierent trust models to be exibly plugged
into the framework and customized by end users. The PTF
provides a number of notable support functions. First, it
enables end users to control the trust evaluation process by
dening which trust models will be used in which circum-
stances and in what ways. Second, end users can dene theirown trust value representation and how trust values of a dif-
ferent representation are automatically converted to theirs.
Third, all such user personalization is stored in a trust pro-
le, which can be easily transferred to other users for reuse.
Customizations to the trust evaluation can be made via edit-
ing the trust prole without having to reprogram the PTF.
Finally, in addition to the above, despite the high automa-
tion of trust evaluation aorded by the PTF, end users will
still maintain a degree of control over the process. For ex-
ample, they can trace how an automated trust decision was
arrived at by examining its provenance recorded by the PTF.
The framework will also notify the users of any abnormality
(for example when it cannot produce a reliable trust value)
and prompt for user intervention in order to correct this.
For the purpose of illustrating the design and concepts of
the PTF in this paper, we will discuss the application of the
PTF for the problem of evaluating the reliability of intel-
ligence information by military analysts. This problem is
particularly interesting because of the variety of intelligence
information (e.g. open-source intelligence, human intelli-
gence, and signal intelligence) requires dierent approaches
to trust evaluation depending on the type of information be-
ing evaluated. In this particular domain, information relia-
bility is rated using the Intelligence Source Reliability rating
[5], which uses labels from A to F to denote the reliability
of the intelligence source. A means `Reliable', B `Usually
reliable', C `Fairly reliable', D `Not usually reliable', E `Un-
reliable', and F `Cannot be judged'.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the PTF and its components. Section 3 then dis-
cusses related work. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper
and outlines potential future work.
2. THE PERSONALIZED TRUST FRAME-
WORK
As introduced in the previous section, the PTF is de-
signed to automate the trust evaluation process by providing
a mechanism for human users to capture their reasoning pro-
cess in order for it to be replicated by computers. The focus
of this paper is, therefore, on developing such a mechanism,
not on trust modeling (which has already been the focus of
much research recently). Hence, it is assumed that end users
will provide the trust models they want to automate (which
can be selected from the many available models, such as
those reviewed in [11] and [8]) and plug them into the PTF
in real-world applications. At a more detailed level, the PTF
aims to address the following issues:
 How a user can dene his trust model selection strat-
egy, i.e. matching a trust subject to be evaluated with
a suitable trust model.
 How an arbitrary trust model can be instantiated and
used by the framework.
 How trust values of dierent representations can be
transformed into a common representation.
In order to cater a wide range of applications, the PTF
makes extensive use of semantic web technologies [2], which
allow information to be represented in a machine-understandable
format, to enable the PTF's information processing capabili-
ties to be extensible to any application domain. More details
on this will be provided in the subsequent sections.
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Figure 1: The trust evaluation process by PTF.
In the next section, we present how trust evaluation is
carried out in the PTF (Section 2.1). We will then discuss
about the main components of the PTF: the Trust Man-
ager (Section 2.2), converters (Section 2.3), and trust en-
gines (Section 2.4). Since trust evaluation may have a sig-
nicant impact on critical decisions, Section 2.5 shows how
the provenance of every trust decision is recorded for future
auditing.
2.1 An Overview of the PTF
The PTF makes use of existing trust models to evaluate
the trustworthiness of trust subjects sent to it. In the con-
text of intelligence information, a trust subject is a piece
of information that needs to be evaluated to determine its
credibility. For the sake of simplicity, we will subsequently
be using the term \document" to refer to any piece of in-
formation to be assessed independently by the framework.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the whole trust evalua-
tion process, coordinated by a software component called
the Trust Manager. The normal ow of execution is as fol-
lows:
1. A document is sent to the Trust Manager along with
its meta-data (1), such as its document type, content
type, originator, referee, etc.
2. The Trust Manager matches the document's meta-
data with its trust prole to determine a suitable trust
model to be used. A corresponding trust engine|an
implementation of the selected trust model|is ini-
tialized with appropriate parameters as specied by
the trust prole. The engine then evaluates the docu-
ment's trustworthiness (2a).
3. The selected trust engine, depending on which trust
model it implements, will derive the trust value of the
document from its meta-data using rules, from pre-
vious experiences with its provider, or from referrals
from trusted sources. The trust value is then returned
back to the main application (3a).User
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Figure 2: The PTF's components.
This normal ow is automated without human intervention.
However, if the Trust Manager detects exceptions in the
process, it will notify the user. The main exceptions are:
the Trust Manager cannot select a trust model based on the
policy in its trust prole (2b), for example when it receives a
document of an unknown type; and the selected trust engine
is not condent that it produced a reliable trust evaluation
(3b), for example when it has no information, or too little
information, for its evaluation. The user can then examine
the document and decide on its trustworthiness (4). Where
possible, the user can also add new rules or update the ones
in his trust prole so that the Trust Manager will know how
to deal with similar cases in the future (5).
As mentioned above, semantic technologies allow the PTF
to be extensible to new types of information without limi-
tation. This is achievable thanks to the central role of the
PTF ontology, which denes the building blocks of the PTF
and provides the core language elements for writing trust
proles. The PTF ontology is represented in OWL
1. New
concepts (described in OWL) that are extended from, or can
be mapped to, those in the PTF ontology are automatically
supported by the PTF (hence its unlimited extensibility).
The PTF ontology will be introduced in part along with the
corresponding PTF components in the subsequent sections.
2.2 The Trust Manager
The PTF's Trust Manager is responsible for coordinat-
ing the trust evaluation process according to the policy in
a trust prole provided by end users (see the relationships
of the Trust Manager with the other PTF components in
Figure 2). The trust prole is described in OWL using the
concepts dened in the PTF ontology. Essentially, it con-
tains a set of rules specifying how documents sent to the
Trust Manager are classied and which trust engines are
used to evaluate those documents. It also contains concepts
(i.e. OWL classes) of the information domain concerned,
enabling the Trust Manager to understand information fed
1OWL Web Ontology Language: a standard of the World
Wide Web Consortium, http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-ref/.
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Figure 3: The PTF ontology's main classes.
to it from that domain. In order to execute the rules spec-
ied in the trust prole, the Trust Manager uses the Jena
Rule Engine
2 [13]. The Trust Manager operates broadly as
follows (see Figure 3 for the PTF ontology's classes that are
referenced in italics):
1. Initially, the Trust Manager loads the PTF ontology
and the trust prole into the rule engine. It then con-
nects the rule engine with the Datastore, a RDF triple
store containing all the knowledge that the system has
recorded.
2. For each document sent to the Trust Manager, it loads
the document's metadata into the rule engine for rea-
soning against the rules in the trust prole and the
knowledge in the Datastore.
3. If the reasoning process results in one or more new
2JENA is a popular open-source Semantic Web Framework
for Java. It provides libraries for working semantic web data
(e.g. RDF and OWL) in various ways. For more details,
see [3]. In the reference implementation of the PTF, the
Jena Rule Engine is used because it supports both OWL
entailments and reasoning on generic rules in one single en-
gine with reasonable performance. As a result, we must
use the Jena's rule format for writing rules. From our re-
view, SWRL [6], an emerging rule language standard for
semantic web (submitted to the World Wide Web consor-
tium in 2004), oers better expressivity and simplicity than
Jena's rule format. However, SWRL's reasoning support
has yet suciently matured for our reasoning requirements
and, thus, we decided to use Jena rule engine until a better
candidate emerges.trust evaluation jobs, stored in an instance of the Ap-
praisalJob class, the Trust Manager loads the relevant
instances of the TrustEngine class (see Section 2.4 for
more details) and sends the jobs to those engines.
4. The results, in the form of instances of the TrustAp-
praisal class, will be returned to the main application.
In order to illustrate the process above, consider a scenario
where online news articles (as open-source intelligence) are
collected and evaluated on their reliability using the Intelli-
gence Source Reliability rating. In this scenario, each Docu-
ment instance represents an online news article. The meta-
data accompanying a Document contains only the URL (i.e.
the web address) of the original article. For instance, we
have the following documents:
URI hasURL
demo:DocBBC1 news.bbc.co.uk/1/.../7219312.stm
demo:DocAJ1 english.aljazeera.net/...925381.html
In the trust prole, we dene the classes Agent, Organiza-
tion, Person, and WebProvider, and a property hasOrgina-
tor (see Figure 3), allowing us to represent the fact that a
document is originated from an agent, which can be a per-
son, an organization, or a web provider. The trust prole
also has a number of instances of Organization class: BBC,
Al Jazeera. In addition, each organization has a property
called hasURLPattern to store the pattern of the addresses
of web pages published by it. For classifying the documents
in this scenario, three rules are added to the trust prole:
1. Rule ClassifyWebProviders:
(?org rdf:type ptf:Organization)
(?org ptf:hasURLPattern ?pattern)
! (?org rdf:type ptf:WebProvider)
This rule, written in the Jena's rule format, states
that if an organization ?org has the property hasURL-
Pattern asserted then ?org is an instance of the class
WebProvider. From now on, for the sake of simplic-
ity, we will only explain what a rule does and omit the
rule's (usually lengthy) denition in Jena's rule syntax.
2. Rule URLPatternOriginator: If the URL of a docu-
ment matches an organization's URL pattern then the
document must have been originated from that orga-
nization.
3. Rule WebDocumentEngineSelector: If a document was
originated by a WebProvider then create an Appraisal-
Job to evaluate the document on the Term Intelligence
Reliability using the engine WebProviderRuleBased-
Engine and the job must return a trust value from the
scheme Intelligence Reliability Rating (see Figure 4).
With these three rules, when DocBBC1 is sent to the
Trust Manager, it can infer that the document was origi-
nated from BBC (Rule 2) and BBC is a WebProvider (Rule
1). Since DocBBC1 was originated from a WebProvider, an
AppraisalJob called DocBBC1Job is created for the docu-
ment to be evaluated by WebProviderRuleBaseEngine (Fig-
ure 4). In the PTF, trust subjects are evaluated not on the
general trustworthiness (which is an ambiguous term), but
on a specic trust term. For instance, the third rule above
species that the document will be evaluated on its intel-
ligence reliability (TermIntelligenceReliability), which is a
custom TrustTerm dened in the trust prole. Hence, with
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Figure 4: DocBBC1Job: an instance of Appraisal-
Job generated by the Trust Manager (with the new
relationships/facts highlighted).
the PTF, end users can exibly dene dierent trust terms
according to their needs and a document can have multiple
trust values on dierent trust terms (e.g. honesty, coopera-
tiveness, and so on).
2.3 Converters
In addition to trust terms, the AppraisalJob in the previ-
ous section also species the expected type of the trust value,
which is IntelligenceReliabilityRating in this case. Since the
WebProviderRuleBaseEngine happens to produce trust val-
ues of the type required (see Figure 4). The resultant trust
value can be returned to the main application immediately.
However, in the case that a trust engine does not produce
trust values in the required representation, the Trust Man-
ager will look for a suitable converter in the trust prole, and
if it nds one, it will execute the converter to transform the
resultant trust value into the required representation. If no
suitable converter is available, the Trust Manager will raise
an exception and prompt for user intervention. Therefore,
end users should dene necessary converters in the trust
prole to enable seamless trust evaluation.
In the PTF, converters can be dened using Jena rules.
For example, consider the FIRE trust model which produces
scalar trust values in the range [ 1;+1], where  1 means
absolutely negative, +1 means absolutely positive, and 0
means neutral. To translate a trust value using FIRE's
scalar representation to the Intelligence Reliability rating,
we dene a converter in the trust prole with rules like this:
\if the FIRE scalar value is greater than or equal to 0:25
and less than 0:75 then the Intelligence Reliability rating is
B."
In cases where Jena rules are not suciently expressive
for the required complex conversion calculations (e.g. con-
verting from a probability density function as used in [14]),
a custom Java class can be provided with its class name reg-
istered in the trust prole. The Trust Manager will load the
Java class when the converter is required and the custom
Java class will be responsible for the conversion.2.4 Trust Engines
Having created appraisal jobs for incoming documents,
the Trust Manager puts the jobs into a queue and executes
them independently. For each job, it loads the specied
trust engine and sends the job to the engine. A trust engine
is identied by a unique URI
3, for example the URI for the
WebProviderRuleBasedEngine is ptf:WebProviderRuleBased
Engine. The URI is used to locate the trust engine's speci-
cation in the trust prole, which helps the Trust Manager
know how to build the engine when required. After a trust
engine is successfully executed, it produces an instance of
the class TrustAppraisal which contains links to the tar-
get document, the resultant trust value, the trust term on
which the document was evaluated, and a condence value.
The condence value reects the reliability of the trust value
as judged by the trust engine and is calculated in dierent
ways, depending on the particular trust model used. The
Trust Manager uses this condence value to determine if
the resultant trust value can be returned to the main appli-
cation immediately or a user decision is needed (based on a
preset threshold).
In the PTF, a trust engine is typically provided in a Java
class. A TrustEngine instance in the trust prole then pro-
vides the link to the Java class of the corresponding en-
gine, allowing the Trust Manager to load the engine when
required. An exception to this is the class RuleBasedTrust-
Engine, a special sub-class of TrustEngine. Trust engines
of this class use rules to derive trust values and rely on
the Trust Manager's rule engine for reasoning capabilities.
When building such engines, the Trust Manager simply loads
their rules directly from the trust prole. Hence, the class
RuleBasedTrustEngine allows end users to build simple trust
engines in their trust proles very quickly. For example, in
our evaluation, the WebProviderRuleBasedEngine is built
from the following two Jena rules:
1. Rule TrustedOrgDefault: If a document originated from
an organization of the class TrustedOrganization then
its Intelligence Reliability rating is B (i.e. `usually re-
liable') and the condence value of this assessment is
0.5.
2. Rule UnknownOrgDefault: If a document was origi-
nated from an unknown organization (i.e. not in the
class TrustedOrganization) then its Intelligence Reli-
ability rating is F (i.e. `cannot be judged') and the
condence value of this assessment is 0.5.
Since we asserted in our trust prole that only the BBC
is a TrustedOrganization (Figure 3), the execution of Web-
ProviderRuleBasedEngine on the sample documents in Sec-
tion 2.2 will give rating B to DocBBC1 and rating F for
DocAJ1, a simple and quick classication based on the doc-
uments' URLs.
In addition to the above, the PTF ontology also allows
users to dene composite trust engines (class CompositeEn-
gine) that produce trust values by combining the results of
two or more trust engines (which can even be composite en-
gines themselves) in some way. For example, in our reference
implementation, we dened a trust engine called MaxCon-
denceEngine, which executes the WebProviderRuleBased-
Engine and the FIREEngine (using the FIRE model) on the
3A Uniform Resource Identier (URI) is a string of charac-
ters used to identify a resource on the Internet.
same document and selects the result with a higher con-
dence value. By so doing, the MaxCondenceEngine always
has a trust value from the simpler WebProviderRuleBased-
Engine as a backup in the cases where the more sophisti-
cated FIREEngine cannot nd sucient evidence to pro-
duce a reliable trust value. The possible way of combining
dierent trust engines are unlimited.
2.5 Auditing
Since automated trust evaluations may have a signicant
impact to critical decisions (in military operation planning,
for example), from time to time, end users will need to know
how certain trust values were produced. In the PTF, this is
captured using the class OriginationContext. Each TrustAp-
praisal instance produced by the PTF is accompanied with
an OriginationContext instance that records the minimum
following information
4:
 Subject: the link to the TrustAppraisal concerned.
 Timestamp: when the evaluation was carried out.
 Agent: the link to the trust engine used (and that to
the converter if the original trust value was converted).
 Originator: the link to the original AppraisalJob that
led to the TrustAppraisal concerned.
In addition to providing a way for end users to trace back the
trust evaluation of a particular document, the information
in an OriginationContext instance can be useful for other
information management purposes. For example, when the
user updates one of his trust engines, trust appraisals pro-
duced by that engine can become outdated or invalidated.
The context associated with such appraisals can help to ag
documents with outdated trust appraisals when they are
displayed to the user.
3. RELATED WORK
An automated trust framework that allows trust mod-
els of dierent types to be used together and allows user
personalization to the trust evaluation process is a novel
idea that has not been investigated in the current litera-
ture. However, a number of the PTF's components have
some similarities with existing work in other areas. First,
the problem of rules/policy-based management has been
studied extensively in various work (see [9]), whose focus
is mainly on how to apply rules and regulations on various
processes (e.g. identity authentication, access rights, obli-
gations). The PTF's Trust Manager, however, uses rules as
an extensible means to replicate a human's reasoning pro-
cess (in selecting a suitable trust model). The idea of using
rules for deriving trust (i.e. RuleBasedTrustEngine) is not
new in trust research. Nevertheless, it is usually considered
rather simplistic (and too domain-dependent) and, as a re-
sult, most of trust research has not followed this direction.
We agree with this view, but still provide RuleBasedTrust-
Engine in the PTF because it provides a simple approach
for those who are not trust experts. Such an approach can
also work well in combination with more sophisticated trust
models.
4A trust engine can add extra contextual information to the
OriginationContext of a trust appraisal, if applicable.In [10], a taxonomy was developed for dierent types of
reputation (a form of trust value) representation. It also
dened a number of conversion functions to facilitate repu-
tation information exchange between dierent trust models.
This work has similarity with the converters in the PTF.
The main dierence is that the conversion functions devel-
oped in their work target computational trust models while
the PTF's converters aim to consolidate dierent trust rep-
resentation into a common, human-dened representation.
The work in [10] can serve as a reference for developing
PTF's converters, but it cannot replace the end user's role
in this process.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented the PTF, a novel approach to
trust evaluation automation to support information quality
assessment. It is unique in providing mechanisms for end
users to exibly dene trust engines and to plug in exist-
ing trust models to suit their trust evaluation requirements.
Trust proles in the PTF allow end users to capture their
reasoning process in trust model selection (and controlling
the trust evaluation in general), in addition to capturing
domain knowledge, and enable computers to replicate the
process. Moreover, with the use of semantic technologies,
the PTF is extensible to any information domain and appli-
cation. Despite being designed to be a highly automated so-
lution, the PTF still provides ways for end users to audit its
trust evaluation process. It will also notify the users of any
anomalies and prompt for their decisions. The users thus
still play an important role in this process by making deci-
sions about trust and actively improving their trust proles,
but only when this is necessary. By doing all the above, the
most important contribution of the PTF, perhaps, is that
it paves the way for existing computational trust models to
get closer to mainstream adoption.
The PTF is a complex framework, which can benet from
improvements in a number of areas. First, editing trust pro-
les is currently carried out by ontology editors, which are,
inherently, not tailored for the PTF. Therefore, we plan to
develop a simple editor that facilitates editing and manag-
ing trust proles (e.g. creating rules from PTF and domain
concepts, testing rules). Second, we will investigate further
the reuse of trust proles. An example reuse scenario can
be as follows: (1) an organization uses a default trust prole
to bootstrap its members' PTF; (2) each member improves
their trust prole when prompted for decisions by their PTF;
(3) the improvements (i.e. emerging trust evaluation prac-
tice) can then be analyzed and incorporated back into the
organization-wide trust prole. Finally, reasoning over a
large dataset stored in a database backend (by the Trust
Manager) performs poorly as a result of the vast numbers
of database interactions involved. This is an open research
problem that is not particular to the PTF but aects its
performance nevertheless. On this front, we are exploring a
number of caching strategies that selectively load only a rela-
tively small set of relevant data to computer memory (before
a trust subject is evaluated) for a signicant improvement
of the reasoning performance yet can still maintain the cor-
rectness of the reasoning.
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